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RESTRUCTURING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY -WHAT IS REALLY NECESSARY?
"Tonight, I propose a permanent Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security to unite essential agencies that must work more closely together: Among them, the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, Immigration officials, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency…What I am proposing tonight is the most extensive reorganization of the federal government since the 1940s." President George W. Bush "The right organization will not guarantee success. But the wrong organization will guarantee failure."
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
The challenges of improving homeland security in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 and subsequent events, such as the anthrax outbreak and sniper shootings, have revealed numerous governmental deficiencies in the prevention and response to terrorist attacks, as well as operational adaptation by response agencies and officials at all levels of government. Citizens have witnessed both glaring gaps in coordinated action by federal, state, and local agencies and effective joint mobilization to deal with the consequences of the attacks. A new recognition exists of the criticality of governments to act effectively on an intergovernmental, interorganizational, and interdisciplinary basis, as well as a recognition that the required relationships are not in place and, in many instances, may not be well understood.
1
The restructuring transformation necessitated by this new environment is already under way. Faced with organizational dysfunction, President Bush moved rapidly to address the most immediate difficulty -the absence of adequate coordination among the widely dispersed agencies and competencies within the federal government involved in securing the American homeland. The President addressed these deficiencies by creating the Department of Homeland Security. This department will play a central role in implementing the National Strategy for Homeland Security. 2 This new Department will also bring together 22 entities with critical homeland security missions, and streamline relations between the federal government and state and local governments, the private sector, and the American people.
3
There is perhaps no ideal bureaucratic structure for dealing with terrorism. The threat is amorphous and constantly shifting. Most experts agree that the federal government's existing structure is ill-suited for managing the threats of the 21 st century. 4 In an attempt to change that, the White House is mounting the most ambitious restructuring of federal agencies in a halfcentury. However, the mission of homeland security, in whatever way it is defined, is not new. This paper analyzes several post-September 11th challenges between the new threat environment, homeland security and strategy, and what decision-making structure fits best. It also describes several organizational challenges facing the restructuring effort for homeland security. Finally, it recommends action to enable the nation's homeland security apparatus to operate effectively in support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
THE NEW THREAT ENVIRONMENT
Changes in the international threat environment, such as that which occurred on September 11th, have immense repercussions for organizational design and decision-making.
Scholars of organizational behavior have focused on the critical relationship between an organization and the environment in which it operates. Organizations are "open systems" that are shaped by their environments. 6 One of the key management tasks for any bureaucracy, public or private, is to create policies and processes that will enable it to achieve its goals given the risks, constraints, and opportunities that exist within its operational environment. 7 This is a critical notion for national security decision-making: It operates within an international political environment as well as a domestic political environment and must adapt to developments and trends. Organizations accomplish this by adjusting or reevaluating their strategies. 9 One of the most important aspects of this notion of strategic choice is the idea that "structure follows strategy". 10 Organizational design depends on the strategic goals of the organization and their adaptation to meet the demands of the environment. In terms of national security, major changes in the international system call for strategic and organizational reassessment, but not necessarily wholesale restructuring. national security structures that created the current U.S. architecture for decision making, capped by the interagency National Security Council (NSC). 2 The NSC was to function as the last forum of advice and debate before the president makes a decision. However, the growth in power of the NSC staff and the national security advisor into the president's own White Housebased national security bureaucracy was a significant departure from the initial design.
14 It has become a non-statutory end-run around established decision-making structures, an adaptation based on presidential decision-making needs as well as individual leadership/management styles.
The NSC advisory structure fluctuated from administration to administration through the years, changing committee structures and processes and shifting from formal to informal styles. 15 Interestingly, since 1989, that structure has stabilized under the presidencies of Bush 41, Clinton, and Bush 43. Thus, as the Cold War ended, the key decision-making unit within the U.S. Government ceased to adapt or change.
In a non-event, unique in international affairs, the Soviet Union, one-half of the great power competition, faded away. The international system changed, not by cataclysmic war, but by the internal collapse of one side of the balance of power. Though the result was an uncertain evolution of the international system, the United States operated as if the major task involved in national security was to prepare for the next cold war, one that would look similar to the U.S.-Soviet competition. Thoughts persisted that the United States was the only superpower remaining, but its unipolar status would be fleeting. 16 A great power or "peer competitor" would rise, and the United States would have to prepare to meet that challenge. 17 The issue was global hegemony and the right of a victorious superpower to shape the international system.
The Bush 41 Administration's "Defense Planning Guidance" of 1992 viewed the post-Cold War world as a struggle for power among nations; the U.S. grand strategy, at its most basic, should deter new great powers from rising. 18 The Clinton Administration saw U.S. unipolar hegemonic power as the means through which the United States would remake the world. 19 The spread of free trade, humanitarian intervention, and the growth of democratic states rested, in part, on the United States' ability to wield what the administration called "history's most powerful military".
20
The current Bush Administration's foreign policy (post September 11) leaned toward unilateralism, an assumption of great power competition, and a belief in the necessity of maintaining hegemony.
21
This is not a case of wise men and government officials ignoring the terrorist threat and its changing nature. 22 However, terrorism remained a secondary issue. Since September 11th
and the beginning of the administration's "global war on terrorism," the question has become how to fit this new priority into the old strategy. The answer to that question should provide guidance for incorporating new homeland security decision-making structures into the old or creating new departments and agencies for new missions.
HOMELAND SECURITY AND STRATEGY
It is argued here that homeland security should be seen as a subset of national security. 
26
Crafting a coherent strategy requires a view of terrorism as a political act undertaken by groups with very definitive political agendas. 27 The rank and file of the terrorist cadre may be War, the United States sought to contain a global ideology antithetical to our own (in idealist terms) or a global Soviet alliance that threatened to overwhelm American power (in realist terms). Today, the United States will try to contain a global terrorist force that is not unified by ideology or nation-state affiliation, but by general goals (opposition to U.S. regional and global hegemony), by methodology (violence that will inflict mass casualties), and perhaps by an operational alliance of convenience (shared finances and technology). The United States is clearly not simply containing this foe. The Bush doctrine of global war on terrorism is more akin to the Reagan doctrine of containment: it aims to destroy the capability of terrorists to operate any place on the globe, rather than merely to prevent them from attacking the United States and its foreign-based assets.
28
Insurgency and guerrilla warfare present an instructive analogy. Terrorists are not engaging in direct challenges to U.S. military assets (force on force). U.S. preponderance prevents that and inspires a new strategy. Terrorism is an "asymmetric threat" in which a much weaker enemy confronts a greater power with strikes against its vulnerabilities. 29 In this sense, the war on terrorism is a battle against a foe that will hit U.S. assets and citizens repeatedly and has the specific purpose of leaving as much debris in its wake as possible, both human and material (mass effects). Al-Qaeda and its allies cannot hope to militarily defeat the United
States, nor can they hope to physically remove U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan, whatever is necessary to end that vulnerability and prevent that loss, whether this means specific policy change or a less interventionist foreign policy in general. The casualty-averse image of the U.S. public lends credence to such an approach, even if that image is essentially a misperception.
30
However, the nature of terrorist strikes against U.S. soil requires a new approach to foreign policy. If the fight against terrorism is a war, then homeland security manifests itself as a modern spin on the classic fifth column problem -agents of the enemy operating within the home front. Dealing with them requires not only a merger of national security and homeland defense strategies, but one that allows homeland security and national security operational separation as well. Many have lamented the lack of national strategy of homeland defense , a vulnerability assessment, or the development of a "unified field theory" of homeland defense .
31
A unified field theory or national strategy must acknowledge where homeland security and national security overlap and where they do not -the current National Strategy for Homeland Security misses this ingredient. 32 Ultimately, both concepts seek the same goals -the security of the nation and the fulfillment of U.S. national interests. A broad concept of homeland defense might include everything from missile defense to better security at local reservoirs. Though the terrorist threat promises to blur the distinction between law enforcement and national security, this does not integrate the two issues completely. In most cases, these are still distinct tasks conceptually that should be organizationally separate but strategically coordinated. Preliminary assumptions about the new threat environment, U.S. strategy, and governmental organization for homeland security should identify three categories: the new threat environment, instances where national security and homeland security must operate together, and instances where they must act separately. Table 1 provides a brief look at the new strategic environment. • Ultimate U.S. national interest is to create a stable regional and global post-Cold
War world premised on free trade, democracy, and human dignity
• The United States plans to remain a hegemon (using internationalism) as a means to accomplish these goals
• All of the goals of U.S. foreign policy that existed before September 11th have not disappeared. Combating terrorism and homeland defense represents a shift in priorities and resources
• Opponents of the United States and its preferred global order now have the capability to strike the U.S. homeland and have made efforts to develop the capability to do so with weapons of mass destruction/effects
• The costs of U.S. hegemony and the pursuit of its national interests have increased significantly (reference our current budget deficits)
• As in the Cold War, U.S. alliances are necessary to combat terrorism and may include U.S. cooperation with states whose political systems and foreign policy interests are antithetical to our own (China, Iran)
• National security threats have merged with threats that previously were considered to be only criminal in nature (terrorism, immigration violations, money laundering)
• America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones
• Counterproliferation efforts should focus on both state actors and non-state actors security. This is a direct criticism of the executive order approach of the President.
49
The problem with the departmental model is five-fold. First, the number of agencies with responsibilities pertaining to homeland security is so large and diverse that no single agency could possibly manage them all. 50 Historically, reorganizations have been long, costly struggles that only sometimes have produced better-run programs. At other times, they have made things worse. Reorganization veterans point to the creation of the Energy Department in 1977, where reshuffling made life more difficult for the agencies involved. 51 Daalder and Destler summarize several studies and find that the number of agencies engaged in some homeland security function is estimated at anywhere from 40 to 151 -and this is only at the federal level.
52
Warren Rudman, co-chair of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21 st Century, acknowledged that the National Homeland Security Agency is not a replacement for agencies that have homeland security functions or for the interagency process. 53 The creation of something like the National Homeland Security Agency might be a useful tool for consolidating aspects of homeland security, but such an agency cannot be the focal point for strategic planning and coordination. 54 The creation of one agency to gain control of homeland security calls for a complete overhaul of the entire bureaucratic structure of the federal government. It would alienate the old departments that the new department must work alongside. Second, the history of the federal government illustrates clearly that presidents want control over the executive branch. They want to be able to direct the federal government from the Oval Office. Their view of their own cabinet departments and federal agencies ranges from deep suspicion to frustration. Organizational and bureaucratic politics models of governmental decision detail instances in which cabinet officers are proponents of an agency perspective, agencies are too wedded to standard operating procedures or incremental policy change, and the implementation of decisions is blocked or reinterpreted. 58 Presidents see the key to management and control as the creation of an executive office bureau that mirrors the function of a cabinet agency. This "presidential branch" allows the President to run the government from the White House, streamlining decision making and bypassing the federal bureaucracies as he sees necessary.
59
Third, historical analysis of the NSC reveals it has served the nation well through numerous wars and regional conflicts. 60 The post-Cold War world spawned a host of novel security missions for government: peacekeeping and post-peacekeeping operations, civil reconstruction, counterproliferation, threat reduction, information warfare, and conflict prevention. Although it is widely agreed that the United States needs to be able to accomplish these missions, no fundamental changes have been made in the security architecture to create better or additional institutions and capabilities for them; proof that the necessity for the creating of a "Department for National Security" has been lacking. 
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In any case, the problem remains this: The overriding priority for dealing with terrorism is the coordination of government activities. As noted earlier, this will likely be performed through an interagency process within the White House, no matter what the statutory design might be.
Congress must learn to live with this reality and find meaningful ways of providing oversight.
Forcing the Homeland Security Advisor to be accountable to Congress would solve little. The
President might then turn to another official to coordinate administration policy and advise, while the statutory official becomes merely an out-of-the-loop spokesman for administration policy.
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Because Congress already oversees the policies and budgets of all agencies involved in Homeland Security, it should use its traditional power of the purse as clout. In addition, it might accept a role in institutionalizing the Homeland Security Council itself as a statutory entity, rather than relying on the next President to abide by Bush's executive order.
Presidential Staff versus the Cabinet
Two of the most common themes in the literature on presidential decision-making are the centralization of power in the White House and the resulting rivalry between executive departments and presidential staff, in particular the national security advisor and NSC staff versus the Secretary of State. 71 The Homeland Security Council, the homeland security advisor, and the council staff might develop rivalries with a host of agencies and officials from the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Health and Human Services, as well as the FBI and FEMA. This could be a recipe for severe bureaucratic turf wars.
The prevention or resolution of these battles depends on presidential leadership. The
President must create a decision-making style in which all officials feel they have sufficient access to the President, a fair chance to convince the President that they have the right solution to the problems facing the nation, and a key role in the policy process. At the same time, the President must make it clear that he makes the decisions and that the homeland security advisor is an extension of his authority and responsibility to coordinate the work of a diverse array of federal agencies.
In the realm of national security policy making, problems arose when the National Security Advisor became a policy advocate and the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, rather than a coordinator of the policy process. 72 This is a particular danger for the homeland security advisor. Given the huge array of agencies that deal with the issue, it might be tempting for the President to seek out a single person for advice, rather than having to consult numerous different advisors on an issue. It is inevitable that in matters relating to homeland security, the President will confer with the Homeland Security Advisor more than with any other official. This is a function of location. His office is located in the White House; others may be only a phone call away, but that is a large distance in presidential time and space. It may also be a function of the size of the Homeland Security Council, which has 12 permanent members and 13
additional officials who may attend on an issue-specific basis. If the interagency process becomes bogged down in disputes, the Homeland Security Advisor and his staff may be the It is a matter of balance within the advisory process rather than one of organizational structure, and it can be resolved only through presidential involvement.
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National Security Council versus Homeland Security Council
The division of labor between the Homeland and the National Security Councils and their staffs, embodied in the working relationship between their advisors, may be the stickiest problem. The good news is that the post of national director and deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism, the President's principal advisor for the global war on terrorism, reports to both the homeland and national security advisors. 74 An element of coordination is designed into the new structure. This dual-hatted official can help to ensure the two staffs coordinate their processes and share information. Yet, the Homeland and National Security Councils could easily become rivals, fighting over jurisdiction in a turf battle that hinders coordination and the crucial teamwork that is often the hallmark of good decision-making. A division of labor and method of linking the two councils must be developed before competition becomes bureaucratic warfare. In such a situation, there may be a disagreement over which council and which staff should take the lead. This was the case for many administrations when the NSC itself was composed of a number of equal committees. 75 Before the advisory process begins, a decision on how to decide had to be made first. The dilemma disappeared when the NSC committee structure became a single chain of command in the Bush Administration, a structure that has become institutionalized. The issue will resurface again over the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council.
Resolving this potential process glitch and quashing any rivalry between the homeland and national security advisors requires some planning and informal structures. First, the administration should develop a sense of what issues are to be addressed and where, before the dilemmas arise. At the most basic level, this is a decision about which bureaucracies have the competencies necessary to deal with the situation effectively. 76 At the senior level, certain issues would belong to specific councils. Given the overlap in membership, this may not be as much of a problem as it could be. Second, the administration should develop a list of issues that are shared responsibilities. This might require a joint meeting of committees within the two councils and co-chairs from both staffs. However, the administration should err on the side of caution and be ready for rivalry. Table 2 provides a preliminary list of overlapping and separate issues. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Certainly, the past actions to create a single agency to oversee the operational units responsible for homeland security -the Coast Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service -makes a lot of sense. However, it is important to remember that based on what we know so far, the failures that left us vulnerable were more analytical than operational. That kind of shortcoming will not be corrected by moving colored boxes around on an organizational chart.
80
In light of the major disadvantages of a more radical approach (creating a department), this paper proposes a relatively modest change to the present Homeland Security structure. The
President should give the Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council greater authority and capacity to carry out planning and coordination, to include implementation, of interagency programs. 81 This suggestion builds on the existing strengths and flexibility of the Homeland Security Council, modeled after the NSC. This continues the historical trend of adapting a Security Council process to enable the President to manage and coordinate interagency efforts better. 82 With the newly created Homeland Security Council, changes to the process would focus on integrating the traditional domestic agencies into the Homeland Security
Council process, and improving interagency action by establishing clear authority and responsibility for interagency issues.
One must remember that federal agencies have been protecting borders, securing infrastructure, regulating the flow of goods and people entering the country and performing various other homeland security functions for years. State and local officials and the private sector perform many key aspects of homeland security, and much of what makes or breaks a federal program occurs far from Washington. It might be useful for both legislators and bureaucrats to consider why those functions have been handled inefficiently before they simply are shifted into a new organizational chart.
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In addition, the President might consider adding a state governor, county commissioner, and a metropolitan mayor to ensure strategic representation of state and local interests. 84 This addresses the requirement for vertical coordination so seriously needed if the different levels of government are to be fully prepared for responding to the new threats. 85 Another option is to create a cadre of people, drawn from various agencies but responsive to the Office of Homeland Security, who would be sent into the field to coordinate as a minimum the federal government's response efforts.
86
The heart of this effort is for Congress to partnership the Office of Homeland Security with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) so the Office of Homeland Security would have budget authority and powers of the purse necessary to fulfill its mission. The desire to establish a new department of cabinet rank sprung from a concern that the Office of Homeland Security lacked independent funding and budgetary control. 87 Even without this, the President through the OMB staff can provide overall direction by setting fiscal guidance and singling out priority programs. 88 Congress would also need to make the Office of Homeland Security a statutory entity so it cannot be dissolved by a new administration. This would give the office the permanence that it currently lacks, being established by executive order. It should also elevate the director to the same level as his departmental colleagues, at least in the eyes of the law.
89
The creation of the Homeland Security Department is top-down reform to improve security at a time when the most useful form of protection comes from the bottom up -from a security guard noticing something strange at a power plant, from a customs officer following up a hunch, from passengers overpowering a shoe bomber. Even after the new mega-merger, those are the people who will keep the homeland secure. The interagency model, embodied in the Homeland Security Council, is a better fit given the nature of the threat, the costs involved, the crucial need for coordination and expediency, and the realities of governmental decisionmaking. Following this course of action will enable the executive office to swiftly resolve difficulties that are inevitable (bureaucratic turf wars), for no single agency or department could ever hope to deal with the full range of issues involved with this new threat. This model for the organization of homeland security efficiently and effectively supports the National Strategy for
Homeland Security of 2002, to "serve as the unifying core of the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in homeland security".
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